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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
TRUST ACCOUNTING
Upon receipt by the testamentary trustee of the distribution from
the executor one of the immediate problems of the trustee is to deter-
mine what is to be included in the inventory' and at what value.
Since the adoption of the amendment to the Uniform Principal and
Income Act in Wisconsin, 2 it would seem that the entire distribution
to the trustee should be considered corpus except for that portion of
the distribution which is net probate income and also should be treated
as trust income.3 Neither statutes nor Wisconsin cases appear to indi-
cate what value is to be used as inventory value by the trustee, but it
seems to be the practice of trustees to simply continue the valuation
assigned by the appraisal during probate.4 After the trust is established,
whether testamentary or inter vivos,5 the trustee must, of course, deal
with problems of allocation of subsequent receipts and disbursements
to principal or income and apportionment between successive trust
beneficiaries.
Money or property received as rent of realty or hire of personalty,
corporate dividends (other than in the shares of the declaring cor-
poration), and interest are generally credited to the income account.6
Receipts of money or property obtained on the transfer (except by
lease) of property forming a part of the principal, as loan repayments,
in liquidation of a corporation, as proceeds of property taken by
eminent domain, as proceeds on property insurance, and any changes
in the form of principal are generally credited to the principal account.
7
CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
1. Stock Dividends, Splits and Rights
A major controversy has long existed on whether or not the principal
or income beneficiary of a trust should benefit from a corporate stock
dividend in the declaring corporation. The "Massachusetts rule" arbi-
trarily allocates cash dividends to income and stock dividends to prin-
cipal.8 The basis for the rule is its practicality and convenience for
the trustee because the trustee can simply rely on the form of the
'Wis. STAT. §323.01(1) (1961) requires the testamentary trustee to file with
the county. "a true inventory of all the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate so devised or bequeathed."
2Wis. LAWS 1961, ch. 57 established Wis. STAT. §231.40(3a) (1961); UNIFORM
PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr § (3) (a).
3 WIs. STAT. §231.40(3a) (e) (1961).
4 Where the trust is to consist of a specific amount of property, or of prorata
shares of the residue, a reappraisal at the time such property becomes part
of the trust appears to be the common practice, however.
5 There is no statutory requirement of an inventory for inter vivos trusts but
presumably the settlor and trustee agree on the valuation of the assets when
the trust is established. This may also be necessary for gift tax purposes.
6 Wis. STAT. §231A0 (3) (a) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr §3(1).
7 Wis. STAT. §231.40 (3) (b) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §3(2).
8 Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868).
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dividend in order to determine the recipient of the benefit. The
"Pennsylvania rule," on the other hand, looks to the source of the
dividend, whether it be from retained earnings or from capital surplus
and whether or not the amount from which the stock dividend was
declared was accumulated prior to or after the commencement of the
interest of the income beneficiary.9 While this rule is sound in its
equity, yet the burden upon the trustee in analyzing balance sheets and
profit and loss statements is substantial. Under a third theory, known
as the "Kentucky rule," a stock or cash dividend is allocated to the
person entitled to receive the income at the time without regard to
when it was earned.10 Wisconsin followed the Pennsylvania rule prior
to the adoption of the Uniform Principal and Income Act.11
With the passage of the Uniform Act in Wisconsin, however, the
"Massachusetts rule" was adopted and "all dividends on shares of a
corporation forming a part of the principal which are payable in the
shares of the corporation shall be deemed principal." 12 The allocation
of stock dividends in the declaring corporation to principal is sound.
As pointed out by the Oregon court in Stipe v. First National Bank,
13
which followed the Uniform Act and allocated stock dividends to
principal:
A stock dividend takes nothing from the property of the cor-
poration and adds nothing to the interests of the shareholders.
The property of the corporation is not diminished. The stock-
holders' interests are not increased. Their proportional interests
remain the same. The only change is in the evidence which rep-
resents a given stockholder's interest, that is, the new shares
representing the same proportional interest that the original
shares represented before the issue of the stock dividend. In
short, the corporation is no poorer and the stockholder is no
richer than they were before. A stock dividend is, therefore,
not in any true sense a dividend at all. Its issuance is, in the
last analysis nothing more than an incident or process in cor-
poration bookkeeping.
14
9 Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1859).
10 Cox v. Gaulbert's Trustee, 148 Ky. 409, 147 S.W. 25 (1912).
11 Soehnlein v. Soehnlein, 146 Wis. 330, 131 NAV. 739 (1911) ; Miller v. Payne,
150 Wis. 534, 136 N.W. 811 (1912) ; Estate of Merrill, 193 Wis. 84, 213 N.W.
641 (1927); Will of Jenkins, 199 Wis. 131, 225 N.W. 733 (1929); Estate of
Paddock, 213 Wis. 409, 251 N.W. 229 (1933) ; Estate of Boyle, 235 Wis. 591,
294 N.W. 29 (1940).
1
2 WIs. STAT. §231.40(5) (a); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND IxcOME Acr §5(1). The
REVIsED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §6(a) does not change this
rule. The American Law Institute has changed its position from the adoption
of the "Pennsylvania rule" in RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §236(b) (1935) to the
"Massachusetts rule" in RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS §236(b) (Supp. 1948),
the "Massachusetts rule" being continued in RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRusTs
§236 (b) (1959).
13208 Ore. 251, 301 P. 2d 175 (1956).
14208 Ore. 251, 301P. 2d 175, 186 (1956).
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In Will of Allis,' 5 the Wisconsin court followed the Uniform Act
by allocating a two per cent stock dividend to principal. A query on
the wisdom of the Act is raised at this point. Since the practice of
issuing small stock dividends is quite common, owners of these stocks
probably consider them in the nature of income. Settlors of trusts,
unless the issue is brought to their attention, probably consider them
in the same manner and their unannounced intent is that the benefit
should go to the income beneficiary. 1 6
Another area where the Uniform Act has proved inadequate is
where a corporation's policy is to declare periodic stock dividends.
Such is true with many "growth stocks" which plow earnings back
into the business rather than distribute them. The Uniform Principal
and Income Act might label such stock as unproductive property where
the yield is less than one per cent of inventory value or cost and such
stock is held for more than one year. In such situations the income
beneficiary is entitled to share in the net proceeds, based on a five per
cent return formula, when the stock is ultimately sold." This section
of the Uniform Act is subject to several objections. 1.) It only applies
where "the trustee is under a duty to change the form of investment."' 8
Hence, the section should not apply where the "unproductive stocks"
were unproductive at the time of purchase; otherwise the trustee
either: a.) should not have purchased the property under the generally
accepted prudent man rule,19 or b.) has the duty to sell immediately
after purchase. 20 2.) A five percent rate of return is above the rate of
return on trust investments in recent years.21 3.) Perhaps the section
does not even apply to stocks because not "realty or personalty." 2 The
156 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W. 2d 226 (1959).
16 This problem was discussed by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in the consideration of the 1962 Revised Uniform
Principal and Income Act, but resistance to change "arose from a desire
to avoid the research and computation which it would involve." Bogert,
The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 50,
54 (1962).
"7 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, §11. It has been suggested that in lieu
of the one per cent and five per cent requirements, property is unproductive
when income is produced substantially less than the current rate of return
on trust investments and income's share should be determined on the cur-
rent rate of return on trust investments. RESTATEMENTS (SECOND), TRUSTS
§241 (1959) ; 3 ScoTr TRUSTS §241 (2d ed. 1956).
38 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, §11 (1) ; The Revised Uniform Principal
and Income Act removes this qualification altogether.
19 RESTATEMENTS (SECOND), TRUSTS §227 (1959), BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§611 et sec. (2d ed. 1960) ; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS §227 (2d ed. 1956).
20 Ibid.
2 Browning, Problems of Fiduciary Accounting, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 931, 948
(1961). Texas, Colorado, Kansas and Vermont have reduced the five per cent
credit to income to four per cent. VERNON'S ANN. Civ. ST. art. 742 5 (b) 35;
C.R.S. 53, 57-4-11, KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp. 58-911, 14 V.S.A. §3311. The REVISED
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §12 reduced the credit to four per cent
also.
2 Following "personalty" Texas adds "whether tangible or intangible property"
VERNONES ANN. Civ. ST. art. 7425 b-35. The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL
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Wisconsin legislature did not adopt this section of the Uniform
Principal and Income Act, thus avoiding the aforementioned prob-
lems, but creating a further one since the income beneficiary can gain
almost no benefit from the stock of a corporation pursuing a stock
dividend policy. This being true, a trustee in Wisconsin who pur-
chases or retains such stocks might violate the "prudent man rule" 23
since:
[A] fiduciary shall exercise the judgment and care under the cir-
cumstances then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs,
not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent dis-
position of their own funds, considering the probable income as
well as the probable safety of their capital. [emphasis added] 4
It has been suggested that the Uniform Act should be amended to
cover certain stock dividends declared in connection with a corporate
reorganization, allocating such dividends to income. This situation
would arise where a new issue of preferred stock is intended to
compensate for dividends in arrears, but where the corporation lacks
the cash to pay them.25
A purely techincal oversight in the Uniform Act is its failure to
direct allocation in the case of a stock split. The Florida Court had
no difficulty, however, in allocating a "2 for 1" stock split to principal
in Pentland v. Pentland.26 A stock split does not increase the value of
the interest nor represent any greater net worth in the corporation,
nor result in any greater dividends. The Pentland case points out that
even though the allocation is to corpus the remainderman gets no
immediate right to this "increase" in corpus, but the title to the addi-
tional shares accrues to the trustee because of his legal title to the
original shares, and the income from the new stock is given to the
life beneficiary.
When the trustee receives "rights" enabling him to purchase addi-
tional shares, other securities or obligations in the corporation dis-
tributing the "rights," such "rights" and the proceeds from any sale
of these "rights" are allocable to principal .2 ' This is merely a codifi-
AND INCOME AcT §12 eliminates the problem by referring to "any part of
principal" rather than "realty or personalty."
23 If a substantial part of the corpus consists of productive assets, the "prudent
man rule" might be construed as relating to the aggregate of the investments
and not to one single investment.
24 WIs. STAT. §320.01(1) (1961).
25 Nossaman, The Uniform Principal and Income Act, 28 CAL. L. R. 32 (1939);
The REvisED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr §§6(b), (d) would allocate
these stock dividends to income.
26 113 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1954). The court applied the UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND
INCOME Acr §5(1) on stock dividends to stock splits. The REVISED PRINCIPAL
AND IN cOME Acr §6(a) specifically allocates stock splits to principal.
27 WIs. STAT. §231.40(5) (b) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
§5(2); The REvISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr §6(a) has a
similar rule.
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cation of the previously existing law of Estate of Merrill8 which
awarded the proceeds of the sale of stock rights to corpus.
It is a well-nigh universal rule that the benefit of a right given
by a corporation to its stockholders to subscribe at par, or
other fixed amount less than the intrinsic value, for a new
issue of stock, whether sold or exercised by taking new stock
is awarded to corpus and not to income, to the remainderman
and not to the life tenant.2
9
2. Cash, "Cash or Stock" Option Dividends, and Dividends in Kind
All dividends in cash are allocated to income under the Uniform
Principal and Income Act.30 This changes the previously existing law
in Wisconsin under Estate of Boyle31 which credited ordinary cash
dividends to income and allocated extraordinary cash dividends be-
tween income and corpus. The burden upon trustees under this rule
was substantial, as several factors had to be considered in order to
determine whether a dividend was extraordinary and thus subject to
allocation. These factors were six:32 (1.) whether similar dividends
have been declared with regularity in the past; (2.) whether such
dividends are regularly paid out of current earnings; (3.) the fre-
quency with which the dividends are declared; (4.) the size of the
dividend in relation to the market value of the shares at the time of
the creation of the trust; (5.) the designation, if any, placed upon it
by the directors of the corporation; (6.) the source of the earnings
from which the distribution is made. Such detailed considerations
under the Wisconsin law prior to the adoption of the Uniform Act
certainly invited trustees to seek court determination.33
Where the trustee has an option of receiving a dividend in cash
or in the stock of the declaring corporation, the dividend is allocated
to income, irrespective of the trustee's choice.
34
28196 Wis. 351, 220 N.W. 215 (1928). Estate of Merrill overruled Will of Bar-
ron 163 Wis. 275, 155 N.W. 1087 (1916) which had held the trustee must
apportion between the life beneficiary and remainderman according to the
proportion of the surplus which was accumulated while the stock was held
in trust.
29 Estate of Merrill, 196 Wis. 351, 355, 220 N.W. 215, 216 (1928).
30WIs. STAT. §231.40(3)(a) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
§(3) (1). The same rule is adopted by the REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND
INCOME AT §6(d).
31235 Wis. 591, 294, N.W. 29 (1940).
32 In Estate of Boyle, 235 Wis. 591, 598, 294 N.W. 29, 32 (1940) the court fol-
lowed RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §236 (a), comment c, (1935).
23 In the Boyle case the court found that the cash dividends were paid with
great regularity at frequent intervals over a period of years, that the dividends
were normal and appear to have been regarded as ordinary dividends and so
designated by the directors, and that although the dividends were not wholly
from current earnings, but some from surplus, this circumstance alone did
not make the dividend extraordinary. It was ordinary corporate procedure
to invade surplus in order to pay dividends when current earnings were
insufficient.
34 WIS. STAT. §231A0(5)(a) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr
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The Oregon Court in Stipe v. First National Bank of Portland,35
while holding that an "option dividend" should be credited to income,
recognized that the option must be a true opiion. In that case the
remainderman claimed that the stockholders had previously decided to
take the dividend in stock and that the option was one in form only
for the purpose of securing a tax benefit. The presumption of oinnia
rite acta praesumuntur (which places the strong burden of establishing
irregularity of corporate proceedings by Clear and convincing proof)
could not be overcome, however, in this case.
Dividends in kind are allocated to income." This includes not only
"whiskey dividends" but also dividends in the shares of a corporation
other than the declaring corporation. An exception to the last stated
type of property was adopted in Wisconsin, presumably to cover situ-
ations where a corporation must divest itself of shares in another
corporation of governmental anti-trust action:
[A]ny distribution of shares or other securities or obligations of
corporations other than the distributing corporation, or the pro-
ceeds of sale or other disposition thereof, made as a result of a
court decree or final administrative order by a governmental
agency heretofore or hereafter entered ordering the distributing
corporation to divest itself of the shares, securities or other
obligations shall be deemed principal unless the distributing cor-
poration indicates that the distribution is wholly or partly in
lieu of an ordinary cash dividend in which case the distribution
to the extent that it is in lieu of the ordinary cash dividend
shall be deemed income.37
Allocation of scrip dividends is not specifically covered by the
Uniform Act. While it might be arbitrarily allocated to income under
the general rule that
[a]ll receipts of money or other property paid or delivered as
* . . dividends on corporate shares payable other than in shares
of the corporation itself . . . shall be deemed income . . .38
yet it is felt that the more logical view is to treat a scrip dividend as
either principal or income depending upon the type of property for
which the scrip is exchangeable.3 9
§5(1). The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INcOmE Acr §6(d) is sub-
stantially the same.
35 Supra note 13.36Wis. STAT. §231.40(3)(a) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOmE Acr
§3 (1) ; The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §6(d) has a similar
rule.
37 WIS. STAT. §231.40(5) (a) (1961) ; The RVIsED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND IN-
COME Acr §6(b) (3) adopts the Wisconsin change.
358 WIs. STAT. §231.40 (3) (a) (1961) ; UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOmE Acr §3(1).
The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOiE Acr §6(d) is to the same
effect.
9 Stauer, The Uniform Principal and Income Act, 21 OR. L. REv. 217, 237(1942).
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3. Capital Gains Dividends
In recent years, because of a generally rising stock market, invest-
ment companies have been distributing capital gains dividends to their
stockholders. When the trustee receives these dividends, under Wis-
consin law he must allocate these dividends to principa40 since Wis-
consin changed the provision of the Uniform Principal and Income
Act.41 Because the Wisconsin rule of allocation of capital gains divi-
dends to principal is merely stated as an exception to the rule of
allocation to income where there is an option on the part of a stock-
holder to receive a dividend in cash or stock of the declaring corpora-
tion, the statute assumes that investment companies never distribute
capital gains dividends in the form of cash only.4 2 The statute does
not cover the case of a "closed end" investment company which only
declares capital gains dividends in cash. Following the general rule,
such a capital gain dividend is allocated to income. Court decisions
applying common law4 3 have held that capital gains dividends of in-
vestment companies are income since they represent the profits of the
investment business (i.e. the situation is no different than a dividend
of a corporation engaged in selling real estate). On the other hand
the view has been taken that the gain realized by the investment
company on the sale of securities is equivanent to the gain the trustees
realize when he sells securities and that the mere medium of an invest-
ment company should not alter the allocation by the trustee.44
Because Wisconsin allocates the capital gains dividends to corpus
a substantial question might arise as to whether investment company
securities are a prudent investment by the trustee45 since the regular
cash dividends of an investment company are low (part of the invest-
ment return being the capital gain dividend), thus prejudicing the
income beneficiary.46 A further problem arises when the trustee is
40 WIS. STAT. §231.40(5) (a) (1961).
41 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §5(1). In the REvIsEr UNIFORM PRINCI-
PAL AND INCOME ACT §6(c) the Commissioners have reversed position and
now follow the rule of allocation to principal.
42 At present it appears that investment companies do not distribute cash capital
gain dividends without an option to take stock. The probable reason is their
desire that the stockholder exercise the stock option, the investment company
thus retaining the use of the stockholder's money. The REVISED UNIFORM
PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §6(c) allocates capital gains dividends to principal
whether in the form of cash or an option to take new stock or cash or an
option to purchase additional shares.
43 Matter of Byrne's Estate, 192 Misc. 451, 81 N.Y.S. 2d 23 (1948) ; Matter of
Rosenthal's Estate, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 483 (1951) ; Matter of Hurd's Will, 203
Misc. 966, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 103 (1953) ; In re Bailey's Will, 20 Misc. 2d 539,
188 N.Y.S. 2d 1005 (1959); Rosenburg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 160 A.2d
601 (1960).
44 Putney, Capital Gain Dividends, 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 22 (1956).
45 Supra notes 23 and 24.
46 Bogert, Uniform Principal and Income Act Revised, 101 TRUSTS AND ESTATES
787 (1962). Bogert, The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 38
NOTRE DAME LAW 50, 53 (1962).
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in fact delegating his investment duty and incurring excessive costs of
trust administration because charges are made by both the trustee
and the managers of the investment company's portfolio.
4 7
4. Liquidating Dividends
Corporate distributions labeled by the corporation as liquidating
dividends are allocated to principal as return of the stockholders' in-
vestment.48 The Uniform Act places emphasis upon the label given
by the corporation, thus reversing the case of Estate of Mathews,"9
which indicated that a liquidating dividend was apportionable. Neither
Wisconsin nor the Uniform Principal and Income Act specifically refer
to partial liquidation, but the general provisions of the statute0 would
presumably allocate to principal.
When a corporation's assets are generally of a wasting nature (e.g.
natural resources, patents, copyrights, leaseholds, or royalty rights),
whenever that corporation distributes dividends it is returning some
of its assets to the stockholder. This is in fact a partial liquidating
dividend which should be allocated to principal.5x The Wisconsin
Court recognized this fact in Estate of Wellsj 2 and while the holding
of that case was based on the intent of the settlor who had a large
estate and wanted to preserve the corpus, the trust holding shares in
lumber and mining corporations, the court stated that it was in accord
with the general common law:
[[]t is to be remembered that there is a well established legal
principle that, where a testator establishes a trust in property for
the benefit of a life tenant with remainder over to another and
the property is wasting nature, such as mining stock or land
stock, the dividends on which represent in part a practical
diminution of corporate assets, in the absence of a clear expres-
sion of the testator's intention to the contrary, the life tenant
will be entitled to receive only the current rate of interest on
the value of the trust property, and the remainder of the divi-
dends will become a part of the principal of the trust fund, to
be invested anew by the trustee.5 3
Should a situation such as the Wells case arise in Wisconsin today
it would be equitable to regard only that portion of a mining or
47 Id., Prof. Bogert feels that corporate trustees will, under the Revised Uni-
form Principal and Income Act, make more use of their own common trust
funds.
48 WIs. STAT. §§231A0(3) (b), (5) (c) (1961). UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME
AcT §§3 (2), 5(3). The first named section allocates proceeds from the liquida-
tion of other trust property to principal.
49210 Wis. 109, 245 N.W. 122 (1933).
5oSupra note 48. The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §6(b) (3)
clarifies the problem of partial corporate liquidation dividends by allocating
them to principal.51 Supra note 48.
51 156 Wis. 294, 144 N.W. 174 (1913).
53 Estate of Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 304, 144 N.W. 174, 177 (1913).
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lumber stock as principal which in fact represents a liquidation of the
corporation's assets and regard the amount attributable to current
earnings to income but it is not clear that such a result is permissible
under our present statutes. 54
PREMIUM AND DISCOUNT BONDS
1. Premium Bonds
The general common law rule5" and that recognized by the Wiscon-
sin Court in In re Allis's Estate5 6 required the amortization of bond
premiums, for the reason that to the extent of the premium paid, the
bond is a wasting asset and the amount of the premium must be re-
turned to principal out of the interest collected from acquisition to
maturity or disposition." In other words, since the principles control-
ling a trustee's investments are safety and permanency with a view
of securing a probable income for the beneficiaries, where a bond is
bought at a premium, in essence, an amount is advanced out of
principal to provide for a higher than normal return for a bond of
that quality and face value. Amortization is proper to prevent a loss
when the securities mature.
Payment of the whole annual income to the beneficiaries for
life would produce a loss and diminish the principal, to the
injury of the remainderman. This method of dealing with the
fund operates most equitably between the life tenant and the
remainderman, in that they mutually share the advantages and
losses.58
The Uniform Principal and Income Act as proposed and as
adopted in Wisconsin, however, reverses the common law requirement
of amortization of bond premiums by establishing the bond as princi-
pal at its inventory value or, if none, at market value or cost where
purchased later regardless of par or maturity and that upon maturity
or sale, the gain or loss falls upon principal.5 9 Apparently, the change
was made because of the practical problems of accounting for small
amounts by trustees. Trustees expressed this view through a question-
naire sent to them, feeling that amortization was too much trouble in
the long run since premiums and discounts usually balance out. 60 The
V4 WIs. STAT. §231.40(3) (a) (1961) and UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
§3(1) announce the general rule that cash dividends are allocated to income.
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §239, comment f (1959).
56 123 Wis. 223, 101 N.W. 365 (1904).
5rEstate of Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 309, 144 N.W. 174, 179 (1914) applied the
amortization requirement to premium bonds which were part of the estate at
the time of death, although this view is not universally accepted. Cf. Kemp v.
Macready, 165 App. Div. 124, 150 N.Y. Supp. 618 (1914).
58In re Allis's Estate, 123 Wis. 223, 231, 101 N.W. 365, 368 (1904).
59 WIs. STAT. §231.40(6); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §6; The RE-
VISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §7 does not change this rule.
60 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND
PROCEEDINGS p. 280 (1929).
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question can be raised, however, if it would not be a violation of the
trustee's duty to deal impartially between beneficiaries if a consider-
able portion of the trust estate was invested in premium bonds and
the trustee did not amortize the premiums. Where the trustee simply
purchases a few bonds at a premium, particularly where he also pur-
chases bonds at a discount, failure to amortize would not appear to
be a violation of the duty of impartiality.61
2. Discount Bonds
The Uniform Act, in order to reduce trustee bookkeeping,62 pro-
hibits increasing income payments where bonds are purchased at a
discount.63 This is in accord with the general rule under common law,
at least as to interest bearing securities issued at a discount64 since
there was no fund out of which an accumulation could be made. Wis-
consin, in the case of Will of Wehner65 made an exception and allowed
income payments in the case of non-interest bearing United States
government bonds which were redeemable at any time under a schedule
providing for an increased redemption price at regular intervals.
Wisconsin retained the exception by changing the Uniform Principal
and Income Act, by providing that the increment which occurs on
bonds and other obligations issued on a discount "subject to a definite
appreciation in value on a fixed schedule" shall be made available for
income by a transfer of this amount from principal. 66 The Wisconsin
provision allowing allocation of the increment to income does not,
therefore, because of the "fixed schedule" requirement appear to apply
to those interest bearing bonds purchased at a discount which simply
increase in market value as the instrument nears maturity.
The adoption of the Wisconsin amendment allows the trustee to
purchase short term bills of the United States or United States savings
bonds. In reality, the increase in value of the bond constitutes income
61 Supra notes 23 and 55.
62Supra note 60.63 WIs. STAT. §231.40(6) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr §6.64 Estate of Gartenlaub, 198 Cal. 204, 244 Pac. 348 (1926) ; Re Houston 19 Del. Ch.
207, 165 A. 132 (1933) ; Wood v. Davis 168 Ga. 504, 148 S.E. 330 (1929) ; Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock, 290 Mass. 377, 195 N.W. 389 (1935).
65238 Wis. 557, 300 N.W. 241 (1941). Wis. STAT. §320.01 (1941) codified this
case until the statute was repealed by Wis. LAws 1959, ch. 233, the statute
being unnecessary with the enactment of Wis. STAT. §231.40(6) (1957).66 Other jurisdictions do not require the payment of the annual appreciations
until they are collected at maturity or by other disposition and thus in fact
realized. CODE OF ALA., tit. 58 §80 (1958); COL. R. S. 57-4-6 (1953); CONN.G. S. §45-114 (1958); LAWS oF N. M. ch. 138 §6 (1957); 60 OKL. ST. ANN.§175.30 (1963); VERNON'S ANN. Civ. St. (Texas) art. 7425b-30 (1960).
Trustee bookkeeping is substantially simplified in these states. The RmVIsED
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT §7 adopts a third position as to when
the increment should be paid out for non-interest bearing securities at a
discount as the increment in value is distributable to the beneficiary at the
time of the increment from the first principal cash available or, if none is
available, when realized by sale redemption or other disposition.
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and should be so allocated. Had Wisconsin failed to adopt the amend-
ment, there would be serious doubt as to whether the trustee could
purchase non-interest-bearing bonds since the income beneficiary would
be discriminated against.8 7 The general provisions of both the Wis-
consin Act and the Uniform Principal and Income Act in prohibiting
amortization of bond premiums and increased income payments for
discount bonds bears out the general purpose of providing a simple
and convient method of administration of the trust estate. 68 It
would appear, however, that should a trustee allow too great a dis-
proportion of one type of bond (either premium or discount) he is
failing in his duty to be a prudent investor.6 9
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
Where the trustee receives a going business or farm property and
it is either impossible or impractical to incorporate, the trustee is
faced with the problem of allocating the profit from the business or
farm. The Uniform Act7 ' is subject to the objection that it only covers
sole proprietorships and not partnerships.71 A further problem is the
difficulty of determining what constitutes a business (i.e. what about the
operation of an apartment house)."2 The Wisconsin legislature did not
enact the sections of the Uniform Principal and Income Act which in
essence direct allocation of net profit to the income beneficiary. This
hiatus in the Wisconsin Act might well be filled by applying the
general provisions of the Act,73 a result which might require account-
ing on an asset by asset basis rather than treating the business assets
as a unit. On the other hand, should the court try to find a legislative
intent to continue the common law which treats the unincorporated
business as a unit, it would have to overcome the dilemma that the
omitted Uniform Act sections are basically a restatement of the
common law.74
NATURAL RESOURCES AND WASTING ASSETS
1. Natural Resources
When part of a trust's corpus consists of property from which may
be taken timber, mineral, oils, gas or other natural resources, the
proceeds received on a lease shall be income, but if received as royalties
for the permanent severance of the natural resources from the land
they are principal.75 It has been claimed that this rule is inadequate
67 Supra note 23.
68 Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 365 (1957).
69 WIs STAT. §320.01 (1961) ; supra note 23.
70 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §§7, 8.
71 Supra note 39, at 244.
72 Ibid.
73 WIS. STAT. §§231.40(3) (a), (b) (1962).
24 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSaES §820 (2d ed. 1962).
7 5 WIs. STAT. §231.40(7) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §9.
[Vol. 46
COMMENTS
since minerals can be extracted from the land, thus constituting waste
to the remainderman, and yet the receipts will be allocated to the in-
come beneficiary simply by camouflage the agreement as a lease
although in substance it represents compensation for the severance or
removal of natural resources from the land itself.7 6 The Uniform Act
appears to change the common law with respect to tree farming. Under
common law the proceeds of the sale of trees would be allocated to
corpus unless the sale was an integral part of tree farming (i.e. where
there is periodic cutting and a plan of reforestation). In the latter
situation the timber so cultivated is thought of as merely part of the
annual fruits of the land and hence goes to the income beneficiary. 77
Generally, however, the Uniform Act does reflect the common law"8
that such minerals as oil and gas are wasting assets subject to depletion
and exhaustion by removal and hence not in the same category as
rentals or income from normal recurring production of crops or the
surface use of real estate, since after the oil or gas (or other mineral)
is exhausted its value is gone and not subject to further recovery. The
argument that such royalties and bonuses are considered income for
federal income tax purposes (after depletion allowances) has generally
been unavailing.79
2. Leaseholds, patents, copyrights and royalty rights.
While the Wisconsin legislature did provide for natural resources, 0
it did not specifically provide for other assets which are by their
very nature wasting, such as leaseholds, patents, copyrights and royalty
76 Nossaman, The Uniform Principal and Income Act, 28 CAL. L. R. 32, 46
(1939).
7733 Am. JUR. Life Estates, Remainders §323 (1941); In First Nat. Bank of
Mobile v. Wefel, 252, Ala. 212, 40 So. 2d 434 (1949), the Uniform Princi-
pal and Income Act was not applied because it has no retroactive effect in
Alabama, and the common law tree farming exception was applied.
The REvisED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr §§10, 2(a) (3) appears
to remedy the problem of the tree farming exception by allowing the trustee
to allocate "in accordance with what is reasonable and equitable in view of
the interests of those entitled to income as well as those entitled to principal,
and in view of the manner in which men of ordinary prudence, discretion and
judgment would act in the management of their own affairs."
78 Central Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Gardner, 17 Ill. 2d 220, 161 N.E. 2d
278 (1959).
791d. Several states have amended the Uniform Act by setting aside a portion
of receipts of royalties as depletion allowances and giving the rest to income.
TEx. REV. Civ. STATS. art. 7425b.33 (1960) ; OicLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 60, §175.33
(1949) ; VT. STATS. ANN. tit. 14, §3309 (1958). The REvisa UNIFORM PRINCI-
PAL AND INCOME ACT §9 follows the Internal Revenue Code and allocates
27'/% of gross receipts (but not over 50% of the net receipts) to principal
as an allowance for depreciation. The balance after payment of expenses
is income. While this treatment would only apply to depletable property ac-
quired after the Revised Act becomes effective, "[i]t is believed to be a
desirable recognition of the equities of the income beneficiary and the probable
intent of the settlor, and to be in accord with the treatment of other assets
which are subject to depletion, treated in section 11 of the new Act." Bogert,
The Revised Principal and Income Act, 38 NoTR= DAME LAW 50, 55 (1962).
80 Wis. STAT. §231.40(7) (1961).
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rights."' The drafters of the Uniform Act felt that settlor's probable
intent would be to give receipts from these assets to the income
beneficiary:
[T]he probable intent of the creator of a fund for the benefit
of a tenant and a remainderman is for as simple a system of
distribution of his bounty as is possible, thus, detailed amortiza-
tion plans and accounting practices requiring extensive book-
keeping as to each single item of a trust fund seemed hardly
within the scope of the ordinary testator's scheme of distribu-
tion. To take a single instance. .. where a man leaves his estate
to his wife and children for their lives, remainder to his
grandchildren, it seems a reasonable assumption that he desires
his income beneficiaries to receive in full all royalty receipts
on books he has written rather than that an amortization fund
should be set up out of the receipts from each book. This
assumption as to the property owner's intention makes possible
a simple and comparatively easily administered scheme of ad-
ministration .
2
While the section omitted in Wisconsin 3 would not cover the
problem where a corporation was interposed between the trustee and
the wasting asset, 4 the theory of the Uniform Act that the settlor
intended to benefit the life beneficiary does not square with the previ-
ously existing "Wisconsin" view in Estate of Wells, 5 which although it
dealt with wasting natural resources with a corporation interposed be-
tween trustee and the assets, yet it did announce the view that the gen-
eral intent of settlors would be to allocate the receipts from wasting as-
sets in general to principal to be reinvested for the benefit of the income
beneficiary.
Since the Wisconsin legislature failed to make specific provision
for patents, copyrights, leaseholds and royalty rights, the general pro-
visions of the statutes may apply. 6 The interpretive problem is which
of these general sections should apply? Are patents, copyrights, lease-
holds and royalty rights "receipts of money or other property paid or
delivered as rent or hire of personality. .. or otherwise in return for the
81 The UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §10 allocates the return from these
assets to income where the trustee is not under a duty to change the form
of investment or 5% of the value of the property in income and the remainder
in principal where the trustee is under a duty to change the form of in-
vestment.
For the trustee not to be under a duty to change it would appear that an
express direction to retain would be necessary. Otherwise the trustee would
have a duty to change the investment under the prudent investor rule be-
cause otherwise all the receipts would go to the life beneficiary while the
corpus was wasting away.
82NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS AND
PROCEEDINGS, p. 341 (1930).
3 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AT §10.
84 Supra note 76, at 49.
85 Supra note 53.
8GWVAis. STAT. §§231.03(a), (b) (1961).
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use principal,"' 17 and thus deemed income or are they "receipts of
money or other property paid or delivered as the consideration for the
sale or other transfer, not a leasing or letting, of property forming a
part of the principal . . . or otherwise as a refund or replacement or
change in form of principal" and thus to be deemed principal s The
receipts concerning us here appear to be hybrids and the equitable
allocation under Estate of Wells might well be the proper method
particularly in view of the Wisconsin legislature's failure to meet the
problem head on. A legislative intent not to disturb the common law
is a reasonable interpretation.8 9
UNPRODUCTIVE PROPERTY
The problem of unproductive (or at least "underproductive")
property both under the Uniform Principal and Income Act and in
Wisconsin, at least as to corporate stock, has been dealt with previ-
ously.90 Since Wisconsin rejected the section of the Uniform Principal
and Income Act, dealing with unproductive property,91 the problem is
again whether the legislature intending the general provisions of the
Act92 to apply or whether the legislative intent was to continue the
existing common law. A situation which may commonly face the
trustee is that of real property left in the trust, where there is no
direction to retain it, hence resulting in a duty in the trustee to dis-
pose of the property as soon as it does not continue to produce a
reasonable return for the income beneficiary. While the trustee may
be under a duty to dispose of this property, yet there may be no
market or a greatly deflated market requiring the prudent trustee to
hold on to the property and wait until a reasonable price can be ob-
tained for it. During this period when the trustee is holding the
property before sale, carrying charges are incurred (e.g. taxes, repairs,
maintenance). Should these expenses be charged against income or
principal ?93 If the property is ultimately sold at a profit, the net sale
sT IVS" STAT. §231.03(a) (1961).
88 Wis. STAT. §231.03(b) (1961).
s9 This result is generally reached by the REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND IN-
COME ACT §11 which eliminates the "duty to sell" problem present in the
Uniform Act and allocates receipts from depleting assets other than minerals
and timber, including leaseholds, patents, copyrights, royalty rights and rights
to receive payments under deferred compenstation, agreements, to income but
not in excess of five per cent of the inventory value, the balance being al-
located to principal.
90 Supra, Section on stock dividends, splits and rights.9 1 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INcOME Acr §11.
92 WIS. STATS. §§231.40 (3) (a), (b) (1961).
93 The UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §12 provides that expenses incurred
both in disposing of and as carrying charges on unproductive property shall
be paid out of principal. The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INcOmE Acr
§§12, 13 appears to charge carrying costs against income, but then reimburse
the income account out of principal at the time of the property's disposition.
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proceeds exceeding the inventory value, should the income beneficiary
share in the profits ?A
Assuming for the moment that the general provision of the Act
applies in Wisconsin, then the result would be a harsh one indeed for
the entire net sale proceeds would be allocated to principal since "all
receipts of money or other property paid or delivered as the con-
sideration for the sale or other transfer ... of property forming a part
of the principal ... shall be deemed principal. . . ."95 Hence, none of the
profit would go to income. In addition, all the carrying charges might
well fall upon income.9 6 The remainderman is unduly benefited because
the delay in the sale of the property was so that it might bring a higher
price and the income beneficiary is deprived of income during that
period. Keeping this possible result in mind, the prudent trustee might
be ill advised to hold on to unproductive property for a higher sale
price because of the great burden upon the income beneficiary. As with
the problem of certain wasting assets, however, the Wisconsin court
might well find a legislative intent to continue the common law.
In Will of Des Forges97 the court indicated that where property is
unproductive when it enters the trust it is usually not too difficult to
find a manifestation of the intent of the settlor to retain the property
or that the income beneficiary shall receive no income with respect to
that property until it is sold and that he should thereafter receive only
the income from the reinvested proceeds of the sale.9 8 But where
property becomes unproductive during the administration of the trust,
it would not be equitable for the entire loss to fall upon the income
beneficiary; and the court held that proceeds of the sale should be
94 The UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr §11 provides that the income bene-
ficiary shares in the profit where the trustee was under a duty to sell and
the yield on the unproductive property was less than one per cent of in-
ventory value or cost and property was held for more than one year after
it became unproductive. The amount credited to the income beneficiary is to
the extent of the difference between the net proceeds (sale price less costs
of selling and carrying charges) and an amount which had it been placed at
simple interest would have returned five per cent interest of the period of
unproductiveness. The Revised Principal and Income Act removes the duty
to sell requirement and changes the five per cent rate to four per cent.
95 Wis. STAT. §231.40(3) (b) (1961).
96 WIs. STAT. §231.40(8)(a) (1961) charges all ordinary expenses to income
and then lists specific items such as property taxes, mortgage interest, and
ordinary repairs. This could be construed as classifying all specifically enumer-
ated expenses as ordinary, even those connected with unproductive property.
Wisconsin failed to enact that portion of the UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME
ACT §12 which would charge carrying costs against principal, supra note 93.
97243 Wis. 178, 9 N.W. 2d 609 (1945), motion for rehearing, 10 N.W. 2d 291
(1943).
98 Where real property was productive in the hands of the settlor, became un-
productive during probate, and was unproductive in the hands of the trustees,
the carrying charges should be paid out of the trust principal and not the
residue of the personal estate bequeathed as a non-trust gift. Estate of
Trowbridge, 244 Wis. 519, 13 N.W. 2d 66 (1944).
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apportioned.99 The carrying charges originally paid out of income
also were ordered reimbursed out of the proceeds of the sale. The
equitable approach of the common law seems preferable to a literal
application of the remaining general provisions of the Wisconsin
statutes in this area.
EXPENSES
Ordinary expenses such as taxes, water rates, insurance premiums,
mortgage interest, ordinary repairs, compensation of assistants and
agents are chargeable to income10cI This is in accord with the common
law. 01 In Estate of Mathews02 the Wisconsin Court charged ordinary
and necessary repairs to income since the remainder was entitled to
have the integrity of the corpus preserved.
In Linethal v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co.,1 3 the Alabama
Court elaborated on the meaning of "ordinary repairs" under the
Uniform Principal and Income Act:
All ordinary repairs, such as unstopping of plumbing, replacing
broken glass, inside painting or repapering, repairing of leaks,
and the like shall be chargeable to the life tenant and shall be
paid from the income of said estate.'0
Other expenses such as investment costs, court costs, attorney's
fees, other fees on accountings and maintaining or defending actions
to protect the trust, costs of and assessment for improvements to the
property, and tax on gain or profit defined as principal are chargeable
to principal. 0 5 This also is in accord with the common law.'0 6 In
Welch v. Welch, 01 7 the Wisconsin Court stated:
If the improvements are permanent in character, the principal
is benefited, the effect being merely to substitute one form of
principal for another. It is therefore, fair that the cost for
improvements should be paid for out of principal without
amortization. While the beneficiary entitled to the income may
receive a benefit from the improvements in the form of increased
rentals, this is balanced by the fact that he no longer receives
99 The Wisconsin Court, Wollangk et al. v. Jurgella 243 Wis. 178, 184, 9 N.W. 2d
609, 612, (1945) cited with approval RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §241 (1935) which
provides for apportionment giving the income beneficiary the current rate of
return where income was substantially below the current rate of return. This
rule is continued in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §241 (1959).
100 Wis. STAT. §231.40(8) (a) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Aur
§(8) (1). The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL'AND INCOME ACT §13(a) (1) is
to the same effect.
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §233, comment e (1959).
102 210 Wis. 109, 245 N.W. 122 (1933).
103 249 Ala. 631, 32 So. 2d 368 (1947).
104 Id., 32 So. 2d at 372.
10 5 Wis. STAT. §231.40(8)(b) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACr
§8(2). The REviSED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §13(a)(2) is to
the same effect.
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §233, comment f-k (1959).
107 235 Wis. 282, 290 N.W. 758 (1940).
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income from that part of the principal which is expended in
making the improvements. 08
A problem exists under both the Uniform Act and the Wisconsin
version in that no provision exists for a depreciation reserve for
depreciable property, in direct conflict with both accounting and tax
practice and the actual fact that property, such as buildings, does
depreciate in value even where ordinary repairs are made and main-
tenance expense incurred.
Numerous cases have held, though, that there is no privilege
or duty to set up such a reserve, 10 9 and it is believed that in
view of the settlor's recognized partiality toward income bene-
ficiaries and current low yields on improved realty, a settlor who,
desires to require or permit such a reserve should be required
to state this intent expressly."0
While the general provisions of the Act would appear to preclude
the setting up of a depreciation account,"' where a corporation is
interposed between the trust and the property, a depreciation reserve
would be entirely proper. With the adoption of the Massachusetts rule
of corporate distributions, it would appear that the life beneficiary
would have no right to any of the depreciation reserve should the
property subsequently be sold by the corporation at a profit. -2
Although it has been pointed out that the Uniform Act does not
appear to permit the trustee to establish a depreciation reserve for
property directly held by the trustee,1 13 the Minnesota Court in In re
Wainer's Trust"4 adopted a contrary rule that where depreciable
buildings are acquired with trust funds after creation of the trust,
the trustee should deduct from the gross receipts as an expense item
an amount equal to the reasonable estimated depreciation of the cost
value of the property." 5
108 235 Wis. at 330, 290 N.W. at 780 (1940).
109 Citing In re Davies' Estate, 197 Misc. 827, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (Surr. Ct. 1950),
aff'd, 227 App. Div. 1021, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 710 (1950) (no duty); Laflin v.
Commissioner, 69 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1934) (no privilege).
110 BOGERT, The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 39 NOTRE DAME
LAW 50, 56 (1962).
I" Wis STAT. §§231.40(3)(a), (b) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME
ACT §§3(1), (2).
The REVISED UNIFORMI PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT §13 (a) (2) provides for
a reasonable allowance for depreciation under generally accepted accounting
principles (unless the property is used as a residence by a beneficiary where
the property is purchased after the effective date of the Act.)
112This reverses the rule of Estate of Mathews 210 VWis. 109, 245 N.W. 122
(1933).
"13 Supra notes 110 and 111 ; BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §289 (2d ed. 1962).
"14 117 N.W. 2d 224 (Minn. 1962).
215 It is interesting to note that the Minnesota court did not even cite the Uni-
form Principal and Income Act which has been adopted in that state. Re-
liance is placed instead upon RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §239 (1959)
and 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS §239.4 (2d ed. 1956). The court recognized a conflict
of authority in the permissibility of a trustee's setting up a depreciation re-
serve. \Xhile the case in fact involved the interposition of a corporation be-
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The expense of the trustee's commissions was changed in Wisconsin
by charging 75% to income and 25% to principal irrespective of
whether the fee is computed upon income or principal."1 6 This is
simpler than the allocation under the Uniform Principal and Income
Act which charged to income all trustee's compensation except that
based upon principal and allocated to principal that part of the com-
mission computed upon principal.117 The problem eliminated by the
Wisconsin Act was that of the annual management fee of the trustee
based upon a percentage of the principal which would necessarily
under the Uniform Act have been charged against principal."18
APPORTIONM-UENT BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE BENEFICIARIES
When the interest of an income beneficiary terminates (usually by
his death) any rents, interest, annuities and other periodic payments
subsequently received by the trustee are apportionable between the
deceased beneficiaries personal representative and any succeeding in-
come beneficiary or, if none and the trust then terminates, the re-
mainder entitled to the corpus."19 The exception to this general rule
of apportionment arises in the case of dividends on corporate stock.
The latter accrue on the record date, or if no record date on the date
of declaration. Only dividends accruing before an income beneficiary
dies pass to his personal representative.120 Some corporate fiduciaries
prefer to avoid the detailed accounting required by these rules.' 2' Two
states have also eliminated this detailed accounting.1 22
CONCLUSION
Due to certain deficiencies in the Uniform Principal and Income
Act and the "patchwork" adoption by the Wisconsin legislature, prob-
tween the apartment house property and the trustee, the court did base its
decision upon this fact since the corporate entity was felt to be only a con-
venient mode of handling the property actually accrued by the trust.
116 Wis. STAT. §231.40(8) (c) (1961).
117 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT §8.
"5 According to the fee schedule published in the Fall 1955 issue of Mlilwaukee
Bar Association Gavel, p. 15, trustees' fees, except as to rental income, are
computed as a percentage of the trust principal. The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCI-
PAL AND INCOME AcT §13 splits the regular trustee fee, allocating one-half to
principal and one-half to income, but charges to income all expenses reason-
ably incurred for current management of principal and application of income.
119 Wis. STAT. §231.40(4) (1961); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §4.
120 Wis. STAT. §231.40(5)(e) (1961); UNIFORIi PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
§5(5).
121 A suggested trust form of one of the Milwaukee corporate fiduciaries contains
a provision that at the termination of an income beneficiary's interest, all
income then undisturbed, attributable to his interest, including accruals, shall
be distributed as though it had accrued or had been received after such termi-
nation. This provision would appear to eliminate many of the trustee's ap-
portionment problems.
122 CAL. CIv. CODE §730.06 (1960). Colorado completely eliminated the apportion-
ment section.
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lems of interpretation and application exist. These problems are com-
pounded by the fact that while the Uniform Principal and Income
Act has been adopted in twenty-two states there is a dearth of case
law construing the Act. The 1962 Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act is a substantial improvement over the old Act, but its
mere existence, though unadopted, will raise problems of interpretating
the old Act in situations where the Revised Act differs from the old
Act in that the question will be whether the Commissioners intended
merely to clarify the old Act or whether they intended to change it.
In many areas the Revised Act is merely prospective, and even if
adopted, problems under the old Act will continue.
The mere raising of problems is certainly not an end in itself,
however, but rather a challenge to the draftsman who must provide
for allocation and apportionment where the law in unclear. The drafts-
man has a further duty to the settlor of a trust in those areas where
although the law may be clear, yet the settlor, upon being appraised of
the consequences, may prefer either different rules of apportionment
and allocation set forth in his trust instrument or a trustee with dis-
cretionary powers. In view of the interpretive problems under the
Uniform Principal and Income Act in Wisconsin, it is questionable
whether, if discretionary allocation by the trustee is desired, it should
be limited to areas "where there is no provision made therefor by
statute."'' 23  ALLAN E. IDING
123 One of the forms suggested by a Milwaukee trust company gives the trustee
company the trustee a discretionary power to "determine upon allocations,
charges or credits as between principal and income where there is no pro-
vision made therefor by statute, but regardless of any statute, to charge its
cvstomary annual fee to income."
[Vol. 46
